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Abstract 
This paper develops an attention-based model of party mandates and policy agendas, where 
parties and governments are faced with an abundance of issues, and must divide their scarce 
attention across them. In government, parties must balance their desire to deliver on their 
electoral mandate (i.e. the “promissory agenda”) with a need to continuously adapt their 
policy priorities in response to changes in public concerns and to deal with unexpected events 
and the emergence of new problems (i.e. the “anticipatory agenda”). Parties elected to office 
also have incentives to respond to issues prioritized by the platforms of their rivals. To test 
this theory, time series cross-sectional models are used to investigate how the policy content 
of the legislative program of British government responds to governing and opposition party 
platforms, the executive agenda, issue priorities of the public and mass media.  
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An essential question for the study of party government is the degree to which the 
policy programs of parties in government are shaped through promises made to voters at 
election time, or instead are responsive to shorter-term pressures, such as events, media and 
public opinion. This linkage between mass publics and parties encapsulates the promissory 
and anticipatory elements of representative party government: parties must retrospectively 
build on long-term policy commitments, but at the same time formulate their policy priorities 
in the knowledge that the failure to represent current public concerns may result in electoral 
punishment in the future. Policy-makers must reconcile their past pledges with incoming 
information streams, and decide which problems to attend to and prioritize for action (Jones 
1994; 2001; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In this sense, party mandates coexist with agenda-
setting processes, i.e. mechanisms through which a political system processes information to 
produce public policies. 
The challenge of delivering on election mandates as the same time as responding to 
current public concerns and policy problems is made more acute through the abundance of 
information that decision-makers are faced with on the agenda at any moment in time (Cobb 
and Elder 1983; Cobb et al. 1976; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2005; Adler and 
Wilkerson 2012). This requires parties in government to cope with this excess of information 
by prioritizing some problems, while disregarding others. In doing so, parties are concerned 
with delivering on commitments made in election platforms at the same time as maintaining a 
reputation for good government as a trusted manager of the economy, national security and 
public services. Once in office, parties need to prioritize not only issues related to their 
election mandate, but also those emphasized by other actors, such as rival parties, the mass 
media and public opinion. Drift in the correspondence between election platforms and the 
policy agenda over time therefore combines what Mansbridge (2003) calls “promissory” and 
“anticipatory” models of representation. The former refers to the degree to which policy-
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makers deliver on promises made to voters during campaigns, while the latter refers to their 
calculation of what policy priorities voters are expected to reward in the future.   
Parties in government must balance their desire to deliver on electoral mandates (the 
“promissory agenda”) with a need to continuously update their policy priorities in response to 
changes in public concerns and to information about the state of the world, as new problems 
arise and events occur which require attention and action (the “anticipatory agenda”). 
Hofferbert and Budge (1992, p. 158) importantly note that the reduced impact of the party 
mandate specifically offers ‘… an indication of parties’ responsiveness to the society around 
them and their relative ability and commitment to follow through on society’s agenda.’ In this 
sense, the influence of party mandates on the public policies implemented can weaken as a 
result of ‘external pressure’ (Walgrave et al. 2006) and new issues being forced onto the 
agenda by the intervention of other actors within the system (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 
2010). In this sense, we argue that the representational linkage between party platforms and 
the policy agenda of government is mediated by the continuous updating of policy priorities 
in light of issues of immediate public concern and the need for policy-makers to attend to 
new problems and changing policy conditions.  
The remainder of this paper takes the following form. We start by discussing theories 
of party mandates, agenda-setting and representation. These are used to develop an attention-
based model of party mandates and policy agendas which consists of both promissory and 
anticipatory components. Next we derive specific expectations on the basis of this model and 
features of the British party and governmental systems. We then introduce the data used to 
test our expectations, before undertaking time-series cross-sectional analysis of the linkage 
between party platforms, public priorities, the media agenda and legislative programs in 
Britain from 1983 to 2008. We conclude with a discussion of the results in the British context 
and reflect upon implications for other political systems.  
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Party mandates, agendas and representation 
The “promissory agenda”: party mandates and electoral promises 
 Political parties have long been argued to be ‘indispensable instruments’ of popular 
government (APSA 1950). In the responsible party model, citizens are expected to vote for 
the party whose policy program is closest to their preferences (for an extensive discussion see 
Adams 2001). Responsible parties will in turn carry out those programs upon being elected to 
office – or face the wrath of the electorate at future elections. Parties are also “responsible” in 
the sense of overseeing the general management of government and development of policies, 
and their outcomes (APSA 1950, p. 23). More generally, the impacts of party and electoral 
change on the actions of government are pivotal to debates over the nature of representation 
in advanced democracies (e.g. Klingemann et al. 1994; Przeworski et al. 1999; Budge et al. 
2012; Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014). 
Mandate theory accordingly argues that elections are the principal mechanism for the 
translation of citizens’ preferences into public policy (e.g. McDonald et al. 2004; McDonald 
and Budge 2005). Party mandates can be conceptualized in several forms (for a discussion, 
see Louwerse 2011). Some link mandates with the fulfilment of specific manifesto pledges 
(e.g. Rose 1980; Bara 2005). In those studies, party platforms provide parties an opportunity 
to make commitments to action on particular policies and for voters to make choices on the 
basis of this information. Pledges thus act as a set of high profile and specific promises that 
parties then seek to deliver on. Parties’ policy priorities are then translated into a mandate for 
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government, indicating the bundle of issues – and some of the specific measures – that the 
party will prioritize if elected to office.1  
A substantial line of research has considered the claim that parties deliver distinct 
policy agendas and policy outcomes that reflect the ideological preferences of their voters 
(for a meta-analysis, see Imbeau et al. 2001). Some studies suggest that partisan control of 
government impacts on levels of public spending (e.g. Castles 1982; Castles and McKinlay, 
1979; Blais et al. 1993). Beyond tests of differences between the color of party government, 
there is also evidence that party platforms impact on spending (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; 
1992).2 Only recently, however, have scholars begun to explore the link between partisan and 
institutional agendas. Several studies now show that party control of government matters for 
the content of the policy agenda (see Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jennings et al. 2011; Persico et 
al. 2012; Froio 2012;  Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014) even if the degree of influence 
appears to be limited and largely dependent on the policy domain in question.  
While parties clearly matter for public policy, the strength of the party mandate should 
not be overstated. It is argued that globalization has led to a weakening of the effect of party 
mandates over time (Boix 2000). As domestic governments have lost autonomy to intervene 
in domestic economies, parties are more constrained in shaping policy outputs to reflect the 
preferences of voters (Mair 2008; Scharpf 2000; Hellwig 2014). This reflects a broader point 
                                                            
1 Between elections, prominent statements of policy commitments can act as non-electoral 
mandates for parties in office as they seek to carry out their agenda in subsequent legislative 
sessions (e.g. Bevan et al. 2011). 
2 While spending is an indicator of policy priorities, it does not always function accordingly. 
A party might emphasise the issue of welfare as a priority in its platform, for example, but 
favour cuts rather than more spending. 
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that parties in government are subject to a range of external pressures that may lead to 
substantial drift away from the policy intentions set out in election platforms.  
 
The “anticipatory agenda”: problem-solving and responsiveness to public opinion 
In office, parties cannot always act exclusively as agents of the electoral mandate. If 
parties are responsible “trustees” they also must consider the broader interests of citizens, and 
the conduct of public policy (APSA 1950, p. 22; also see Burke 1968 on the trustee model of 
representation). In practice, parties in government ‘juggle numerous issues simultaneously’ 
(Jones and Baumgartner  2005a, p. 6), with most issues relegated to policy subsystems where 
decision-making takes place in low conflict situations far from the electoral promises made to 
voters. Sudden, unpredictable “focusing” or “trigger” events (Cobb and Elder 1983; Birkland 
1997), such as terrorist attacks, protests or government scandals, can require decision-makers 
to shift their attention to new issues or problems. New understandings of policy problems can 
lead to the disruption of party programs established at election time. Governments can come 
under pressure to change course in response to issues being thrown into the media and public 
spotlight – bringing calls for legislative or executive action.  
Problem-solving is an overriding concern of government, requiring decision-makers 
to divide their attention across a range of social and economic problems and to manage the 
most salient and most urgent (Jones 1994; 2001; Dӧring 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
Mayhew 2006; Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Policy-makers possess scarce institutional and 
cognitive resources to process the vast array of issues that they are faced with at any moment 
in time. Only so many issues can be earmarked for immediate action, while others must wait 
for attention and some disregarded altogether. While parties in government may seek to 
deliver on electoral platforms and existing policy commitments, the necessities of competent 
and responsible government require them to be adaptive to the emergence of new issues and 
problems. For example, an economic crisis or serious threat to national security might require 
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policy-makers to diverge from their existing policy commitments and instead prioritize more 
immediate concerns. Problem-solving is a dominant strategy, Adler and Wilkerson (2012, p. 
6) argue, because the public ‘share common concerns on many issues.’ Problem-solving of 
this sort is interlinked with responsiveness to changes in public priorities, since issues of 
public concern themselves are a function of problem-status in particular domains (e.g. Hibbs 
1979; Wlezien 2005).  
 “Rational anticipation” of future election outcomes, or ‘anticipatory representation’ as 
Mansbridge calls it (2003), thus underpins pressure for parties in government to respond to 
shifts in public opinion at the same time as delivering on their electoral promises. Studies of 
democratic responsiveness have highlighted the role of public opinion in continuously 
shaping the policy outputs of government as an adaptive and iterative process (Stimson et al. 
1995; Wlezien 1996; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The same influence of public opinion can 
also be found in government attention. Studies of agenda representation assess the degree to 
which policy priorities of government correspond to the issue priorities of the public across 
different policy domains and institutional venues (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Jones et al. 
2009; Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011; Lindeboom 2012). Others, like studies of policy 
responsiveness, conceive this representational relationship as a dynamic process, with public 
priorities and the policy agenda equilibrating in response to one another over time (Jennings 
and John 2009; Bevan and Jennings 2014). The idea of ‘dynamic agenda representation’ 
implies that the priorities of policy-makers respond to the concerns of citizens, selectively 
assigning their attention across issues and dealing with policy problems on their behalf 
(Bevan and Jennings 2014).  
Delivering on electoral mandates and adapting to short-term changes in public opinion 
are not the only factors that shape the composition of the policy agenda. Lawmakers are 
subject to pressure on a daily basis through issues highlighted and campaigned on by mass 
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media. While parties in government may be seeking to deliver on electoral platforms, mass 
media can also exert considerable influence in drawing attention to, or constraining debate 
over, policy problems on the agenda. Studies of the influence of media coverage on political 
agendas reveal considerable variation, and the importance of issue types (Edwards and Wood 
1999; Soroka 2002; Walgrave et al. 2008; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Baumgartner 
and Chaqués-Bonanfont 2013).  
In this regard, mass media can perform a mediating or moderating role in the inter-
relationship between electoral mandates and the policy agenda of government. Media issue 
attention is shown to have effects on the content of the political agenda (Soroka 2002; 
Walgave et al. 2008; Thesen 2013), and can also act as a supplier of information about the 
existence of policy problems that require attention from government. Hence, media may 
further disrupt electoral mandates by bringing new issues onto the societal agenda. After all, 
mass media has long been known to influence the issues that government and the public pay 
attention to (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Soroka 2002; 
McCombs 2014).   
 This literature seems to confirm that distinct from indirect representation through the 
mechanism of elections (i.e. mandates), direct adjustment of the policy agenda in reaction to 
changes in public priorities is expected due to the logic of ‘rational anticipation’ (Stimson et 
al. 1995, p. 543) as policy-makers anticipate the future electoral costs of unpopular decisions. 
This gives rise to a continuous process of adaptation in response to public concerns. Given 
the intrinsic scarcity of attention, governing parties must strike a balance between delivering 
on electoral mandates, and responding to shorter-term changes in public opinion and the 
emergence of new problems on the agenda. These countervailing forces may explain drift 
from party mandates, or alternatively explain why policy agendas are not perfectly responsive 
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to the public agenda. The information updating process underpins our attention-based model 
of party mandates and policy agendas. 
 
Electoral mandates, public priorities and the legislative agenda in Britain 
  Theories of party mandates and agenda-setting offer us clear expectations about the 
responsiveness of policy agendas to parties’ electoral mandates and the possibility of drift 
from those platforms due to pressure on lawmakers to adapt to public opinion, other actors 
and events. Our attention-based model of party mandates and policy agendas suggests that 
promissory responsiveness (desire of policy-makers to deliver on their electoral promises) 
will be mitigated by anticipatory responsiveness (desire of policy-makers to avoid future 
electoral sanction for unpopular or incompetent decisions). This is the theory, how might it 
work in practice?  
In this paper we consider the case of British government in its traditional majoritarian 
form, i.e. the archetypal Westminster system (Lijphart 2012), prior to its recent experience of 
coalition politics and shift towards greater multipartism. Over most of the period since 1945, 
single-party government dominated in Britain. In this context, platforms were designed to 
provide clearer statements of intentions than in other proportional systems (Powell, 2000). It 
would therefore be expected that the platform of the election-winning party would exert a 
strong influence upon its legislative agenda in office. As such, parties elected, or re-elected, 
to office would seek to deliver on promises made to voters. The British political system offers 
a perfect test case for whether parties deliver on electoral mandates in a highly majoritarian 
system where strong executives should have more capacity to control the legislative agenda – 
and the vast majority of bills proposed by the government are passed into law. Governing 
parties might, however, also be expected to respond to issues raised by their main opponents, 
seeking to pursue a consensual policy agenda that attracts support from across the political 
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spectrum or otherwise neutralize issues on the party system agenda that are problematic to 
them. A further theoretical expectation, then, is that the policy agenda of government may 
also respond to the election platform of both the government and the main opposition party 
(drawing on Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Through emphasizing issues typically 
associated with their opponents, governing parties can also help undermine traditional party 
reputations for the ownership of certain issues and can “trespass” on issues belonging to their 
competitors (Damore 2004; Sides 2007).  
In the British case, the legislative agenda is heavily influenced by the non-electoral 
mandate communicated in the Queen’s Speech, the executive’s statement of policy priorities 
at the start of each session of parliament (Bevan et al. 2011) which differs from party 
mandates (Bara 2005) and represents the party system agenda in office (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2010). The Queen’s Speech performs the important role in formally setting out the 
legislative agenda, as well as priorities of the executive more broadly. Further, in Britain’s 
majoritarian system, where power is highly concentrated (Powell 2004), legislative proposals 
are typically initiated by the executive which – historically – has tended to hold a working 
majority of seats in the legislature. It would therefore be expected that this non-electoral 
mandate would bind the British government to its announced legislative intentions for each 
session. 
These policy priorities are, of course, influenced by electoral promises, especially in 
the first speech after a general election. However, they also differ substantially from electoral 
mandates, functioning as vehicles for statecraft as policy-makers respond to events, and to the 
success or failure of policies, over the course of the election cycle. In this sense, executive 
speeches may drift considerably from electoral mandates at different points in the electoral 
cycle, as they incorporate information and events that were not foreseeable at the time of the 
previous election. Reflecting both the “rational anticipation” of future election outcomes 
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(Stimson et al. 1995) and external pressures and disruption from policy problems on a day-to-
day basis, we thus expect the legislative agenda to be responsive to the current issue priorities 
of the public, as well as to the media agenda. The latter can be approximated to the supply of 
information about new policy problems on the societal agenda in general, so reflects both the 
agenda-setting power of the mass media and the occurrence of focusing events.  
Our expectations derived from mandate theory and attention-driven choice point to 
competing pressures on the legislative agenda of British government; specifically promissory 
responsiveness to party platforms and anticipatory responsiveness to issues of current public 
concern and focusing events. We expect government to seek to deliver on its electoral 
mandate (while being mindful of the policy platform of its opponents) at the same time as 
updating priorities in response to more immediate matters of public concern and problems 
that emerge on the agenda at short notice. That is our theory, what do the analyses reveal?  
 
Data  
We now test these expectations for the case of Britain: firstly, concerning whether 
party platforms at general elections shape the legislative program of British government over 
the following parliamentary cycle; secondly, whether that legislative program also responds 
to non-electoral mandates communicated through the executive agenda in the Queen’s 
Speech; and, thirdly, whether the legislative program is also shaped by public priorities and 
the media agenda.  
Our analysis is based on data on party platforms, the executive agenda, legislation, 
public priorities and news media in Britain from 1983 to 2008 and derived from theory-
informed specification of models that test the separate elements of our unified model. This 
data is all coded according to the policy content coding system of the UK Policy Agendas 
Project (www.policyagendas.org.uk). The advantages of using this coding framework are 
twofold: firstly it is an established method for coding attention to policy issues, and secondly 
12 
 
it renders the content of agendas comparable across institutional venues and over time 
(Baumgartner et al. 2011). What is coded as a health issue in legislation is also a health issue 
in party platforms and in the public agenda and the media. The policy topics covered by this 
data are listed in the Appendix, Table A1. 
 
Dependent variable 
Acts of the UK Parliament 
Acts of the UK Parliament are the primary legislative output of the UK. Each act is 
coded with a single topic indicating the primary focus of the legislation. The observed time 
point is the date upon which the act was signed into law. Primary legislation provides the 
government with opportunities both for agenda-setting and emphasis of particular issues, as 
well as implementation of substantive policy outputs. Acts of the UK Parliament are therefore 
the main means through which the government enacts its agenda and is able to fulfil previous 
policy promises.  
 
Independent variables 
Party platforms 
To examine party platforms we adapt a new dataset on the policy content of the 
election manifestos of political parties in Britain to create our government and opposition 
platform data. The manifestos data include the platforms of the governing party (i.e. the party 
of the prime minister) and the largest opposition party. The text of each manifesto is coded 
following the traditional quasi-sentence approach (Laver 2001; Laver and Garry 2000), with 
each quasi-sentence assigned a single unique topic code in relation to the policy content. The 
party manifesto data for Conservative and Labour parties is transformed into government and 
opposition platforms based on which of the parties is in control of parliament during this 
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period. These government and opposition platforms are equal to the policy content of the 
party agenda for the party in control of government and for the party in opposition.  
 
The Speech from the Throne 
The Speech from the Throne (also known as the Queen’s Speech) is the prominent 
annual statement that communicates the policy agenda of British government (Jennings et al. 
2011b). It is forward-looking, and lists general policy priorities as well as specific measures 
that the executive intends to address in the upcoming session of parliament. Furthermore, it 
often differs from party mandates (see Bara 2005) capturing updates to the government’s 
priorities over the course of a parliament. The policy content of each speech was divided into 
quasi-sentences, with each quasi-sentence assigned a single unique topic code. Because of the 
timing of the speech, which occurs at the beginning of each parliamentary session, the data is 
organized by parliamentary session. This temporal aggregation is used for all of the analyses 
in this paper. 
Note that the Speech from the Throne measure included in the model of the legislative 
agenda is purged of any variation due to other independent variables by predicting the 
residuals of a model that includes the other independent variables (i.e. public priorities, 
media, government and opposition platforms). The residuals therefore represent the executive 
agenda independent of external pressures.3 Specifically, the equation we use to predict the 
residuals takes the following form: 
 
                                                            
3 The result is a stronger fitting model with less multicolinearity than in alternative models 
that include the Speech from the Throne directly (not reported here). In this alternative model 
that does not purge the other independent variables the speech is no longer significant, but the 
models other findings remain unchanged.  
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QSit = α0 + β1QSit-1 + β2MIPit-1 + β3Mediait-1 + β4Platform(Gov)it + β5Platform(Opp)it     (1) 
 
Where QS it refers to the non-electoral mandate delivered by the executive at the start 
of each session of parliament indicating its priorities for topic i during the forthcoming 
parliamentary year t. MIPit-1 refers to public attention to the policy issue during the previous 
parliamentary year. Mediait-1 refers to media attention to the issue. Platform(Gov)it refers to 
the number of mentions of topic i in the platform of the election-winning party during the 
most recent election and Platform(Opp)it refers to the number of mentions of the topic in the 
platform of the losing party. 
 
Public priorities  
To measure public priorities, we use lagged aggregate responses about the ‘most 
important issue’ (MII) facing the country (as collected by the polling organization Ipsos-
MORI). This follows previous studies that use data on the ‘most important problem’ to 
measure the public prioritization of issues at particular points in time (e.g. Jones 1994; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2004; Bevan and Jennings 2014). These measures have been shown 
to exhibit a high degree of common variation, and thus a comparable indicator of the policy 
concerns and issues on people’s minds at a particular point in time (Jennings and Wlezien 
2011). These are recoded to correspond to the Policy Agendas Project major topic codes.4  
 
Mass media 
 To control for the wider societal agenda (in the continuous flow of information about 
new problems facing government) we include a measure of the lagged media agenda in our 
                                                            
4 The analysis excludes two topics on which responses were consistently equal to zero over 
time: Commerce (15) and Science (17). 
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models. This is generated from coding the policy content of headlines of all front page news 
stories in The Times of London from every Wednesday. It simultaneously captures the media 
agenda as well as shifts in attention due to events.5  
 
Analyses 
The party mandate  
The data on the issue attention of the governing party platform and the legislative 
agenda of British government, aggregated over the lifetime of each parliament, are presented 
in Figure 1. This displays the number of Acts of the UK Parliament relating to a given topic 
in a given parliament (on the left-hand y-axis) compared to the number of mentions of the 
issue in the platform of the governing party at the preceding election (indicated on the right-
hand y-axis). Through a visual inspection of the data there is some evidence of common 
movement in attention to issues in the platform of the election winner and in the legislative 
program of government. For example, the attention of  the government platform and 
legislative agendas to the environment, energy, law and order, commerce, defence, and 
foreign trade all exhibit similar trends or fluctuations. This is suggestive of influence of the 
party mandate, but requires further investigation.  
 
Figure 1.  Government Platforms and Legislative Agendas by Parliament, 1983-2008. 
                                                            
5 Note that the correlation between the public and media agendas across all issues is a rather 
small and insignificant 0.07, indicating that these reflect quite distinct sets of priorities. This 
may be because variation in the public agenda tends to reflect changes in the underlying 
‘problem status’ of issues (see Wlezien 2005; Jennings and Wlezien 2011), whereas the 
media agenda tends to include a more episodic focus on events and policies as part of the 
news cycle. 
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To test our expectations concerning the party mandate and the effect of the 
opposition, time series cross-sectional autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models are used 
to account for the autoregressive nature of the legislative agenda. We assess the overall 
strength of the party mandate, in the transmission of party platforms into the legislative 
agenda enacted throughout the subsequent parliament by pooling across the various issues 
addressed by government.6 While it is certainly true that different issues should respond to 
input agendas at varying rates (see Bevan and Jennings 2014), our question and theory does 
                                                            
6 The pooling of series is often a concern when heterogeneity across series is likely, such as 
in political campaigns or across states (e.g. Kaplan et al. 2006). However as our models focus 
on a single institutional agenda, during a single time period and in one country pooling both 
justified and is the most appropriate way to consider the functioning of the entire agenda 
especially given the interconnected nature of government attention to issues (see Jennings et 
al. 2011).  
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not focus on by-issue variation, but instead on how the overall policy agenda is formed (see 
Bevan et al. 2011) which is made possible by use of the policy content coding system for 
measuring attention to all issues. This tests the degree to which governments in general 
deliver on the party mandate over the duration of their time in office and how they respond to 
the opposition platform. The equation takes the form: 
 
Lawsip = α0 + β1Lawsip-1 + β2Platform(Gov)ik-1 + β3Platform(Opp)ik-1                            (2) 
 
Where Lawsip refers to the number of Acts of the UK Parliament for topic i during the 
current parliament p, Lawsip-1 refers to the number of Acts for topic i during the previous 
parliament p-1, and Platform(Gov)ik-1 refers to the number of mentions of topic i in the party 
platform of the election-winner at the most recent election k-17, and Platform(Opp)ik-1 refers 
to the number of mentions in the platform of the losing party. This model specification 
enables us to ascertain the strength of the party mandate from platform into legislative 
outputs over the lifetime of a parliament, controlling for persistence of the legislative agenda 
at an aggregated level.  
 The results of the time series cross-sectional ADL models, for 19 policy topics over 
the course of 5 elections (N=95), are reported in Table 1.8 These confirm that the legislative 
                                                            
7 We use the notation k-1 to indicate that the government and opposition platform measures 
are observed at the previous election and therefore occur prior to Acts of UK Parliament in 
each parliament and in our later models, for each given year.  
8 The short time series of 5 elections and later 26 years for our second set of analyses is a 
concern for the properties of asymptotic theory. Despite an N of 95 and 425 respectively the 
coefficients are likely downwardly biased with estimates from time series cross-sectional 
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agenda of government is highly persistent between parliaments, where the significant 
coefficient of 0.66 in the third model indicates that two-thirds of the issues addressed in the 
previous parliament are attended to in the current parliament. The three models presented in 
Table 1 consider the possible effect of the governing and opposition party platforms in 
influencing the legislative agenda of government. The third model reveals that when both 
platforms are included in the analysis, there is evidence that the governing party platform is 
translated into its subsequent legislative agenda, with the effect being positive and significant 
at the 95 per cent confidence level (0.037*). In terms of substantive interpretation of the 
results, this means it takes approximately 27 quasi-sentence mentions of the economy in the 
government platform to be translated into an Act of Parliament on the issue (i.e. 
0.037*27=0.999). Given that the average length of a party platform during this period is 
1,235 quasi-sentences this effect size is not inconsequential. The results are therefore 
consistent with the expectation of a direct mandate from the platform of the election winner 
and governing party to the legislative program of government. However, there is no support 
for the expectation that the issues receiving attention in the platform of the main opposition 
party would be also reflected in the legislative agenda. These findings fit with previous 
studies of the party mandate in Britain (e.g. Hofferbert and Budge 1992). As it stands, there is 
a case that party mandates deliver promissory representation in the legislative arena in the 
British case. 
 
Table 1. Time Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Party Platforms and Acts of Parliament.  
 Actsipt Actsipt Actsipt 
Actsip-1 0.634*** 0.668*** 0.661*** 
 (0.177) (0.193) (0.174) 
                                                            
models dependent on the length of time. However, this downward bias reduces the likelihood 
of finding significant effects and thus offers a tougher test of our theory.  
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Platform(Gov)ik-1 0.028  0.037* 
 (0.015)  (0.017) 
Platform(Opp)ik-1  0.01 -0.023 
  (0.026) (0.027) 
Constant 0.493 1.923 0.53 
 (1.349) (1.707) (1.384) 
R2 0.57 0.54 0.57 
N 95 95 95 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
A unified model of party mandates, attention-driven choice and the legislative agenda  
 We next turn to the effect of electoral mandates accounting for the influence of other 
intervening factors on the legislative agenda. To accomplish this, we estimate a model of the 
legislative agenda for each parliamentary year. This includes those years between elections 
with measures of the governing and opposition party platforms being repeated in each year.9 
This allows us to account for the simultaneous effects of mandates, the executive agenda, 
public concerns and the emergence of new policy problems and issues requiring immediate 
attention outside its expected set of priorities. Reflecting our theoretical expectations 
concerning mandates, the executive agenda and rational anticipation related to events and 
public opinion, the equation takes the following form:  
 
Lawsit = α0 + β1Lawsit-1 + β2QS(Residuals)it + β3MIPit-1 + β4Mediait-1                     (3) 
+ β5Platform(Gov)ik-1 + β6Platform(Opp)ik-1  
 
 Where Lawsit refers to the number of Acts of the UK Parliament for topic i during the 
current parliamentary year t. Lawsit-1 refers to the number of Acts for topic i during the 
                                                            
9 These models were also tested for just the years following an election leading to the same 
inferences. 
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previous year. QS(Residuals)it refers to the non-electoral mandate delivered by the executive 
at the start of each session of parliament which has been purged of the effects from the other 
independent variables in the model. MIPit-1 refers to public attention to the policy issue 
during the previous parliamentary year. Mediait-1 refers to media attention to the issue.10 
Platform(Gov)ik-1 refers to the number of mentions of topic i in the platform of the election-
winning party during the most recent election k-1 and Platform(Opp)ik-1 refers to the number 
of mentions in the platform of the losing party. This model specification enables us to 
ascertain the strength of the party mandate from platform into legislative outputs over the 
lifetime of a parliament, controlling for persistence of the legislative agenda at an aggregated 
level. It also enables us to directly compare effects of party mandates with updating of 
attention in response to the emergence of new issues of wider public concern. 
 Our time series cross-sectional analyses of Acts of Parliament are presented in Table 
2.  
 
Table 2. Time Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Acts of Parliament. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Actsit-1 0.528** 0.512** 0.498** 0.496** 
 (0.075) (0.012) (0.012) (0.077) 
QS(Residuals)it-1  0.190** 0.188** 0.187** 0.187** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
MIPit-1 0.038** 0.031* 0.031* 0.028* 
 (0.012) (0.074) (0.078) (0.012) 
Mediait-1 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Platform(Gov)ik-1  0.005*  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Platform(Opp)ik-1   0.007* 0.005 
                                                            
10 Our use of a single lag fits with previous research, however alternative models including 
second lags for each variable led to poorer fitting models and did not produce any significant 
findings for these new variables (see Appendix 2) leading us to conclude that our model is 
appropriate.  
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   (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.876** 0.582** 0.633** 0.506** 
 (0.188) (0.199) (0.198) (0.186) 
R2 0.407 0.416 0.416 0.420 
N 425 425 425 425 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001  
 
 In each of the models reported in Table 2, Acts of the UK Parliament exhibit a highly 
autoregressive nature, as indicated by the effect of the lagged dependent variable, which is 
positive and significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. The coefficient of around 0.5 on 
average means that around half the policy issues addressed in the previous legislative agenda 
are addressed in the next session of parliament. Following previous analyses of the 
transmission of the policy agenda from the Queen’s Speech to Acts of Parliament the model 
also includes a measure of the content of the Queen’s Speech (Bevan et al. 2011); namely the 
residuals of the Queen’s Speech to account for the separate effects of the speech and the 
content of the speech as determined by government and opposition platforms, public 
priorities and the media agenda. The residuals exert a strong positive and significant effect on 
Acts in each of the four models in Table 2 indicating that in part Acts of Parliament are 
determined by the independent content of the speech’s non-electoral mandate. Each model 
also reveals a positive and significant effect of lagged public priorities, consistent with 
previous studies of dynamic agenda representation in the UK (Bevan and Jennings 2014). 
This suggests that the legislative agenda of government responds more consistently to public 
priorities than party platforms (where effects are mixed), suggesting that at least some degree 
of representation falls to the party system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010) and 
not merely party agendas. There is no effect for the media agenda in any of the models. It is 
plausible that changes in the problem status of issues are transmitted via salience of the issue 
to the public and via past values of the party and legislative agendas.  
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 The effect of government and opposition platforms on Acts of Parliament is quite 
mixed. Models 2 and 3 exhibit positive and significant effects of attention to issues in 
government and opposition platforms respectively on the legislative agenda, but when both 
are included in Model 4, these cease to be significant, although the coefficients remain 
positive. The substantial correlation between platforms (0.71), combined with their tendency 
to move together and have the same positive effect on the legislative agenda, is the most 
likely reason for this null finding.11 Despite the effect size being greater for the opposition 
platforms than the governing party, the overall effect of the government’s program on the 
legislative agenda is much greater when considering the combined effects for the Queen’s 
Speech and its platform. Combined, the results presented in Table 2 offer support for our 
expectations concerning the party system agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
Representative party government must reconcile forces that are constantly in conflict. 
The array of issues that political parties and governments are under pressure to react to at any 
moment in time are a function of past policy priorities and commitments. Election platforms 
of parties similarly tend to reflect longstanding commitments to issues, which are the source 
of party reputations and images (Petrocik 1996). Alongside this path dependence in party and 
policy agendas, the rational anticipation of future electoral costs leads for pressure to parties 
to attend to new issues and problems in government. In this paper we have sought to test the 
                                                            
11 While there is little reason to combine the party platforms on the government and 
opposition theoretically, an alternative model with a single combined measure of party 
platforms did lead to a positive and significant effect of 0.0037 with the other inferences 
remaining the same. This result further demonstrates a degree of multicolinearity between the 
government and opposition platforms.  
23 
 
influence of party mandates on the legislative agenda in Britain between 1983 and 2008. 
While there is partial evidence that the policy agenda is responsive to the party system 
agenda – with governing and opposition party platforms having a small effect on Acts of 
Parliament, when modeled in isolation – the preponderance of evidence suggests that the 
legislative agenda of British government tends to be strongly influenced by external pressures 
such as public opinion. This is consistent with the original observation of Budge and Farlie 
(1983; also Budge and Hofferbert 1992) that parties tend to compete on the relative emphasis 
of priorities rather than directly opposed public policies. In government, parties must divide 
their scarce attention between competing alternatives. Our findings indicate the importance of 
deconstructing the determinants of the policy agenda to help understand the causes of policy 
change.  
That parties must divide their scarce attention between competing alternatives has 
important implications for mandate theory. Parties’ ability to stick to their mandate largely 
depends on how they balance their attention between their electoral promises, the promises of 
their opponents, the agenda of the executive, and the issues salient to the public at the present 
time. Parties in government are faced with an array of competing concerns, some of which 
may require them to tear up their pledges, others which may force them to postpone existing 
policy commitments. Our attention-driven model of party government has highlighted this 
balancing of scarce attention with responsiveness to external pressures.   
Our findings raise a number of questions for future investigation. The most important 
of these concerns generalizability. To what extent might this model of party mandates and 
policy agendas be adapted to other political systems? While our evidence is limited to the 
highly majoritarian case of the UK, empirical support for different components of this model 
have been found in other country-specific and comparative studies; such as on party 
mandates (e.g. McDonald and Budge 2005; Froio 2013; Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 
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2014), the non-electoral mandates expressed in executive speeches (e.g. Lovett et al 2015) 
and the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities (e.g. Jones et al. 2009; Chaqués 
Bonafont and Palau 2011; Lindeboom 2012). One might expect the degree of transmission of 
electoral mandates to policy agendas would be a function of the institutional features of 
different political systems (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014); such as divisions of powers, 
differences between unitary and federal systems, and how the relative fragmentation of party 
systems structures government formation (and limits the ability of parties to deliver on their 
promises). The extent to which our findings are generalizable will depend on such factors. 
Clearly the features of the UK system would suggest a higher rate of transmission than many 
other political systems, such as the US (e.g. Lovett et al 2015). Beyond this, does the 
fulfillment of party mandates or short-term responsiveness to changes in public opinion lead 
to better (or worse) election outcomes for incumbents? And to what extent are party 
platforms themselves a function of public priorities? We have not examined the role of 
elections in conditioning responsiveness of platforms or legislative agendas here. These 
clearly are important lines for further inquiry.  Finally, party competition focuses on both 
attention and preferences while our work only considers the former. Divergent policy 
positions adopted on the same issues by parties (see Klingemann et al. 1994) and attempts to 
be seen as the party most trusted to deal competently with issues where there is broad 
consensus over ends, i.e. ‘valence issues’ (Stokes 1963), are further possible dimensions of 
party competition that our findings may speak to. Nevertheless, this analysis has made a start 
in revealing how an attention-based approach can shed light on how governments balance 
responsiveness to electoral mandates and more short-term fluctuations in public opinion. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1. UK Policy Agendas Project Major Topic Codes. 
 
1. Macroeconomics 
2. Civil Rights, Minority Issues, Immigration and Civil Liberties 
3. Health 
4. Agriculture 
5. Labour and Employment 
6. Education 
7. Environment 
8. Energy 
10. Transportation 
12. Law, Crime, and Family Issues 
13. Social Welfare 
14. Community Development, Planning and Housing Issues 
15. Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 
16. Defence 
17. Space, Science, Technology and Communications 
18. Foreign Trade 
19. International Affairs and Foreign Aid 
20. Government Operations 
21. Public Lands and Water Management (Territorial Issues) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table B1: Time Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Acts of Parliament, Two Platform Lags. 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Actsit-1 0.441*** 0.431*** 0.432*** 
 (0.089) (0.095) (0.093) 
QS(Residuals)it-1  0.213*** 0.210*** 0.212*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
MIPit-1 0.031* 0.032* 0.029 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Mediait-1 0.010 0.011 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Platform(Gov)ik-1 0.005*  0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Platform(Gov)ik-2 0.002  0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Platform(Opp)ik-1  0.007 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
Platform(Opp)ik-1  0.002 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.392 0.564* 0.398* 
 (0.200) (0.221) (0.194) 
R2 0.391 0.386 0.392 
N 340 340 340 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table B2: Time Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Acts of Parliament, Two Lags. 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Actsit-1 0.456*** 0.446*** 0.446*** 
 (0.090) (0.095) (0.093) 
QS(Residuals)it-1  0.199*** 0.194*** 0.197*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
QS(Residuals)it-2 -0.055 -0.061 -0.056 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
MIPit-1 0.075 0.076 0.075 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
MIPit-2 -0.046 -0.046 -0.048 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
Mediait-1 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Mediait-2 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Platform(Gov)ik-1 0.005*  0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Platform(Gov)ik-2 0.002  0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Platform(Opp)ik-1  0.007 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Platform(Opp)ik-1  0.002 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.365 0.530* 0.363 
 (0.200) (0.219) (0.192) 
R2 0.397 0.392 0.399 
N 340 340 340 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
